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1 Introduction1
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, a severe credit crunch has had long lasting con-
sequences on a number of advanced economies, where unemployment rates have increased
markedly. The labor market effects of the crisis have not been uniform, and young and less
educated workers have been particularly hit by the crisis (Hoynes et al., 2012). While these
outcomes raise important distributional concerns, it has been argued that crises could also
have a “cleansing” effect to the extent that the least productive jobs and firms are the ones rela-
tively more affected by the financial shock (Caballero and Hammour, 1994; Petrosky-Nadeau,
2013). These developments have triggered a renewed interest on the relationship between
finance and employment (Pagano and Pica, 2012) and, specifically, on the effects of credit sup-
ply shocks have on firms’ employment decisions (Chodorow-Reich, 2014; Buera et al., 2015;
Duygan-Bump et al., 2015).
While this literature provides original insights on the effects of financial crises on aggregate
employment at the firm or state level, it is generally silent about within-firm dynamics and la-
bor reallocation. For instance, little is known about the impact of a decline in firm financing
on different types of jobs, even though a differential impact of the crisis across demographic
groups would have distributional implications. Moreover, the employment adjustment within
firms—between workers and jobs characterized by a different skill content—can have an ef-
fect on aggregate productivity. We contribute to this strand of literature by zooming in on the
employment dynamics within the firm and by providing a series of novel findings on how
firms adjust the level and composition of the labor force in response to credit shocks. In par-
ticular, we focus on worker education and on the skill content of occupations to test whether
the contraction in employment during the global financial crisis has been associated with a
skill upgrading of the workforce, at the firm level. Understanding which jobs and workers
are more exposed to the real effects of large financial shocks provides useful insights to better
understand how firms re-organize themselves at times of crisis and can inform the debate on
1We wish to thank Isha Agarwal, Samuel Bentolila, Tobias Berg (discussant), Mihai Copaciu (discussant), Ro-
maine Duval, Rustom Irani, Andrea Ichino, Francesco Manaresi (discussant), Camelia Minoiu, Michael Neugart,
Divya Kirti, Raluca Roman (discussant), Enrico Sette, Nikola Spatafora, and participants to the 7th ICEEE (Messina,
2017), 2017 AEA Annual Meetings, 2nd IWH-FIN-FIRE workshop on “Challenges on Financial Stability”, Chicago
Financial Institutions Conference (Chicago, 2016), 28th EALE Conference (Ghent, 2016), 33rd International Sympo-
sium on Money, Banking and Finance (Clermont-Ferrand, 2016), the Annual Conference of the Italian Economic
Association (Naples, 2015) and the Annual Conferences of the Italian Association of Labour Economists (Cagliari,
2015; Trento, 2016), and at seminars at the Bank of Italy, European University Institute, Federal Reserve Board,
International Monetary Fund, and University of Torino for helpful comments and suggestions. Financial support
from the University of Torino and Compagnia di San Paolo Bank Foundation with project “Skill mismatch: mea-
surement issues and consequences for innovative and inclusive societies” is kindly acknowledged. The views
expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the Bank of Italy, IMF, or
IMF policy. The usual disclaimers apply. Latest version available here
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the distributional consequences and the possible cleansing effect of financial crises.
We run our analysis thanks to the availability of an original and extremely rich data set, that
draws on an administrative archive that collects daily information on individual job contracts
and labor market flows. The dataset covers the universe of firms, including micro-enterprises,
in an Italian region, matched with their lending banks through the Italian Credit Register.
This is an important feature of our data given that bank credit is very often the only source
of external financing for micro and small enterprises. We end up with a quarterly dataset of
about 200,000 firms, spanning the period from 2008:Q1 to 2012:Q4 for which, thanks to the
degree of granularity of the data, we can go beyond the standard job destruction/job creation
dichotomy to investigate differential responses to a credit supply shocks across firms, workers,
and job contracts.
We find that a 10 percent supply-driven credit contraction reduces employment by 3.6 per-
cent. This effect is the result of adjustments at the intensive and extensive margins, is con-
centrated among workers with temporary contracts, and occurred mostly through increased
outflows rather than decreased inflows. These results are in line with the existence of a “dual”
labor market where temporary contracts absorb large part of the employment volatility. The
reduction in employment is concentrated among relatively less educated individuals and low-
skill occupations, and happened mostly by allowing temporary contracts to expire. By con-
trast, less educated workers with open-ended contracts are almost unaffected by tighter firms’
financing constraints, possibly because of higher firing costs and a rigid employment protec-
tion legislation. Thus, skill upgrading strategies are heavily shaped by contract regulation.
These differential effects are mainly driven by the adjustment at the intensive margin, while
the effects on employment due to firm exit are more homogeneous across contracts and work-
ers. We also find that immigrant and young workers are hit disproportionately more by the
credit shock, reflecting the prevalence of immigrants in low-skill occupations, and the lower
tenure and the higher presence of younger workers in temporary jobs.
To shed light on the mechanisms linking the financial crisis to employment outcomes, we
show that the effect of the shock is concentrated among firms that entered the crisis with a
lower credit rating, a higher debt overhang, and that have weaker relationships with banks.
These results are consistent with the idea that firm balance sheets play a key role in the prop-
agation of shocks, as highly levered firms find more costly to engage in labor hoarding when
financially constrained (Giroud and Mueller, 2016). We also find that the elasticity of employ-
ment to credit supply is especially relevant for micro and small firms, for younger firms, and
for those with a lower ex-ante labor productivity. In particular, a reduction in the supply of
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credit translates in a reduction of employment in low-productive firms that is twice as large
as the average, while there is no statistically significant effect in high-productive firms. This
result, read together with the higher vulnerability of less educated workers and low-skilled oc-
cupations to the financial shock, is consistent with a productivity-enhancing reallocation and
with recent evidence showing a cleansing effect of the Great Recession (Foster et al., 2016).
This paper contributes to the growing literature on the real effect of credit supply shocks
(Amiti and Weinstein, 2011, 2017; Cingano et al., 2016; Paravisini et al., 2015) and is closely re-
lated to the recent contributions that investigate the effects of financial shocks on employment
outcomes at the firm level (Chodorow-Reich, 2014; Benmelech et al., 2015; Bentolila et al., 2016;
Berg, 2016; Caggese et al., 2016; Ersahin and Irani, 2016; Giroud and Mueller, 2016; Hochfellner
et al., 2016; Popov and Rocholl, 2017; Siemer, 2016).2 Drawing on micro-level datasets, these
studies consistently show that a tightening of the credit supply leads to a contraction of the
workforce.
The analysis by Bentolila et al. (2016) has the unique feature of being based on loan level
data from a credit register. Relying on the differences in bank health at the beginning of the
financial crisis, the paper shows that firms exposed to weak banks contracted employment by
2.8 percentage points more than firms that were borrowing from healthier lenders, and results
are able to explain about a fourth of the fall in aggregate employment in Spain between 2007
and 2010. Also, their analysis uncovers that job losses have been mostly borne by tempo-
rary employees, while wages adjusted only marginally. Hochfellner et al. (2016) use employer-
employee matched data for a sample of German firms to look at how individual characteristics
affect labor outcomes. The identification strategy hinges on differences in firm location, distin-
guishing between firms that are located in one the seven federal states where the major bank
was one of the five Landesbanks with significant exposure to the U.S. mortgage crisis, and firms
that are located elsewhere. In addition to confirming the aggregate negative effect of credit
contraction on employment, Hochfellner et al. (2016) show that workers in firms which have
been exposed to a negative credit shock experience significant earning losses and an increase
in the unemployment spell. They also find that unskilled, less educated and less experienced
workers are the most affected by the credit shock.3 While both these studies limit their analysis
2Using more aggregate data other papers provides additional support to the employment costs of the financial
crisis, considering the US and Europe (Boeri et al., 2013; Greenstone et al., 2014; Haltenhof et al., 2014; Duygan-Bump
et al., 2015).
3In a related work, Caggese et al. (2016) show that financial constraints distort firm firing decisions. Financially
constrained firms give more weight to current cash flows than to future ones and therefore decide on whom to fire
on the basing of firing costs, rather than considering expected productivity. This hypothesis is confirmed using
employer-employee matched data from Sweden, which show that financially constrained firms fire relatively more
short-tenured workers, who are on average younger, with steeper productivity profiles and lower firing costs, than
long-tenured ones.
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to medium-sized and large firms, Siemer (2016) uses confidential firm-level employment data
from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics for the universe of U.S. firms, but relies on industry-
level differences in external financial dependence to identify the effects of financial constraints
on employment and firm dynamics. His results show that financing constraints reduce em-
ployment growth in small firms by 5 to 10 percentage points relative to large firms, but they
are silent on within-firm heterogeneity.
Our analysis has the advantage of bringing together three key elements which in previous
studies have been considered separately. First, the availability of loan-level data (instead of
aggregate credit data) allows us to identify the bank lending channel at the firm-level. More-
over, those data make it possible to control for credit demand and productivity shocks at a
granular level, with a set of firm, time, and firm cluster×time fixed effects, which absorb firm-
specific time invariant demand shifters and time-varying demand shocks that are common to
a narrowly defined cluster of borrowers. The matched bank-firm data also allow us to extend
the identification strategy of Greenstone et al. (2014) and construct an exogenous firm-specific
time-varying measure of bank credit supply, which gives us more precise estimates than the
ones obtained with more aggregate data. We start by estimating time-varying nationwide
bank lending policies that are purged of local loan demand (and of any other province-sector-
quarter level idiosyncratic shocks). Then, we build a credit supply variable at the firm level
using banks’ loan share to a given firm as weights. We discuss different arguments to motivate
the exogeneity of our instrument and we show that it is strongly correlated with loan growth at
the firm level. Second, thanks to contract-firm-bank matched data, we can investigate hetero-
geneous responses to a financial shock across firms, workers, and job contracts. In particular,
other than socio-demographic characteristics, we can exploit differences across contract types
and look at the intersection between individual skills and job contracts, to assess which of the
two dimensions matter more for firm’s employment decisions.4 Finally, our analysis covers the
universe of firms. While there is a wide consensus on the fact that smaller firms rely more on
bank financing, the existing evidence rarely focuses on a representative sample of small firms.
Our data, on the contrary, include the universe of individual and micro enterprises and this
allows us to have a more precise (and larger) estimate of the employment effect of financial
shocks.
4In this way, our contribution also relates to and extends the evidence discussed by Caggese and Cuñat (2008),
who show that financially constrained firms in Italy have a more volatile labor force and employ a larger proportion
of temporary workers than financially unconstrained firms.
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2 Data
2.1 Veneto as a representative case study
Our analysis relies upon unparalleled loan-level information about the entire population of
workers, firms and financial intermediaries operating in Veneto, a large Italian region with
a population of 4.9 million individuals and a workforce of 2.2 million workers. According
to the National Institute of Statistics data, the region accounts for roughly 9 percent of the
Italian value added and of total employment. A key feature for our analysis is that Veneto can
be considered as a self-contained labor market. About 97 percent of the workers resident in
the region have their workplace in a municipality within the region, and migration to other
regions is a negligible phenomenon at the aggregate level (0.4 percent of the population per
year); moreover, both figures are substantially stable in the temporal window considered in
the analysis. As a result, it is unlikely that our results will be biased by dismissed workers
finding jobs out of region.
Veneto shares with Italy a large prevalence of small firms (Figure 1, left panel): 94 percent of
firms in the region have less than 10 employees (57 percent have at most one employee). The
productive structure is also fairly similar to the national one (Figure 1, right panel), and the
service and industrial sectors accounts for 56 and 43 percent of total employment, respectively,
with the share of the industrial sector being slightly larger than in the rest of Italy.
In terms of the banking system, in 2012 in Veneto there were about 120 banks, with small
local banks accounting for nearly 20 percent of business loans. The degree of financial de-
velopment, as measured by the number of branches per inhabitants, is higher with respect to
the national average (Figure 2, left panel). Aggregate lending to non-financial corporations
followed a similar dynamic in Veneto and Italy (Figure 2, right panel).
Veneto is hence very well representative of the Italian situation, which in turn represents
an extremely interesting case studies for at least two reasons: first, Italian firms mostly rely on
bank credit for their business activities, and more than other firms in the Euro area (Figure 3,
left panel); second, small firms (less than 10 employees) are the most indebted, and the Italian
productive structure is strongly biased towards small production units (Figure 3, right panel).
2.2 The contract-firm-bank matched data
Our dataset brings together an extremely rich set of information coming from different admin-
istrative sources. In the following we provide an overview of the construction and structure
of dataset, while more detailed information are discussed in the annex A-I. Daily labor market
flows from the regional public employment service are indeed matched to stock information
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form the national social security administration and to the Italian credit register maintained by
the Bank of Italy using firm-level unique identifiers, namely their VAT numbers. These feature
of the data guarantees at the same time wide population coverage, high information reliability
and a nearly total frequency of success in the matching procedure.
The bulk of labor market information comes from PLANET, an administrative dataset
of daily labor market flows maintained by the regional employment agency Veneto Lavoro.
PLANET builds upon the obligation for firms operating in Italy to notice the national and
local employment agencies about all labor market transitions for which they are held responsi-
ble, including hires, firings and transformations of individual employment arrangements (e.g.,
from full-time to part-time, from temporary to permanent, and the like). Firm-level observ-
ables include geographical location and sector (5-digit NACE code), while worker information
covers gender, age, nationality, occupation (5-digit ISCO code), type of contract (44 different
employment arrangement), educational attainment (13 categories), time schedule (full-time or
vertical, horizontal or mixed part-time), and reasons for separation from the firm.
In order to overcome limitations in terms of labor market stocks, PLANET is complemented
with information from ASIA, the archive of active firms maintained by the National Statistical
Institute (ISTAT) with register data from the Social Security Administration. ASIA provides
yearly data about firms whose economic activity spans for at least six months within a calen-
dar year. To our purposes, ASIA adds information on firm size and on characteristics of those
firms who are not interested by any job flows or transitions in our sample period. More specif-
ically, we consider the stock in the first year in which we observe the firm and we reconstruct
the stock forward using information on workers inflows and outflows. The purpose of this
exercise is to guarantee consistency between flows and stocks and, more importantly, to have
quarterly stock data.
To obtain a firm-specific measure of credit availability, we use information from the Credit
Register (CR) database, managed by the Bank of Italy, on the credit extended to each firms in
each quarter. For each borrower, banks have to report to the Register, on a monthly basis, the
amount of each loan—granted and used—for all loans exceeding a minimum threshold (75,000
euro until December 2008, 30,000 euro afterwards), plus all nonperforming loans. Given the
low threshold, these data can be taken as a census.5 Data also contain a breakdown by type
of the loan (e.g. credit lines, credit receivables and fixed-term loans). From CR we essentially
5We do not (explicitly) include interest rates when examining the impact of credit conditions on firm employ-
ment for two main reasons: first, data on interest rates are collected only for a sub-sample of banks that exclude the
majority of small and local banks and this would have entailed a severe reduction of observations and the dismissal
of our census analysis perspective. Second, one may reasonably argue that bank policies on prices are correlated
with those on quantities and that utilized loans—which we use in our analysis—reflect both granted loans and
(unobserved) price effects.
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draw two kind of information. First, borrower’s outstanding loans (from all banks operating
in Italy) at the end of each quarter: we consider the total amount instead of the different types
of loans because banks and borrowers may endogenously change the composition of loans in
reaction to shocks to the credit market. Second, the bank market share for each borrower at the
beginning of the period, that we use to construct the instrumental variable (see Section 3.2).6
One limitation of our data is the lack of information on wages, so that we can investigate
only the quantity response to a financial shock, while we cannot say anything about price
effects. However, very recent empirical evidence on Europe—and explicitly on Italy—shows
that the prevailing labor cost reduction strategy that firms had adopted in response to the Great
Recession has worked through the adjustment of quantities rather than prices (Fabiani et al.,
2015; Bentolila et al., 2016; Hochfellner et al., 2016; Guriev et al., 2016), consistently with the
presence of downward wage rigidities in regulated labor markets (see Devicienti et al., 2007,
for a broader discussion about Italy).
A further potential constraint of our data is the lack of firm balance-sheet information,
which prevent us from 1) controlling for a number of possible drivers of employment deci-
sions, 2) exploring additional sources of firm-level heterogeneity, and 3) assessing the effect
of the credit crunch on capital accumulation. To overcome the first limitation, in the empiri-
cal analysis we saturate the model with a set of granular fixed effects which capture most of
the unobserved time-varying borrower-level heterogeneity. To deal with the second and third
concerns, in Section 5 we match a sub-sample of relatively larger firms with balance-sheet and
income statement data from the CADS database—a proprietary firm-level database owned by
Cerved Group S.p.a.7
2.3 Sample selection and the final data set
All data sources are merged together using VAT numbers as univocal firm identifiers. Genuine
non-matches between PLANET and ASIA are possible, and are due to two reasons: very short-
lived firms (less than a semester in a calendar year) are not recorded in ASIA, while firms with
a very stable employed workforce (meaning no changes in both the intensive and the extensive
margins, including the type of contract) do not appear in PLANET. None of the two entails any
limitation to our purposes, as i) the stock of employed workforce for very short-lived firms can
be easily induced from workers’ flows, and ii) the worker flows in stable firms are by definition
6To construct our measure of credit supply, we use data drawn from the Bank of Italy Supervisory Report (SR)
database. Specifically, we use confidential data on outstanding loans extended by Italian banks to the firms in the
local credit markets (i.e. provinces) to estimate time-varying bank lending policies.
7However, given the wealth of studies on the effect of financial shocks on firm investment, we keep the focus of
our analysis on labor market outcomes.
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null. Moreover, all firms with loan information are also present in ASIA, so extremely short-
lived firms fall beyond the scope of the analysis. This grants that truly unsuccessful matches
are infrequent and largely due to misreporting of VAT numbers by either the firms or the
statistical offices maintaining the single sources, an occurrence that we can safely assume to
be random and – due to the extremely large sample size – almost irrelevant from a statistical
standpoint.
The selection of the sample is driven by two main reasons. First, although the available
time series cover a longer period, we narrow our focus on the years from 2008 to 2012 (the
last available year in most sources at the time of our analysis). The reason is that until 2007
the obligation for firms to notice hires and firings (from which PLANET originates) concerned
dependent workers only and occurred largely through paper documents. The first limitation
resulted in an incomplete coverage of labor market flows, insofar as independent contractors
and disguised self-employees—widely spread in the Italian labor market and at high risk to
represent a buffer stock of employment during downturns—were not observed in the data.
The second limitation entailed in turn a non-negligible delay of data completion. Both have
been overcome during 2007, when digital notice became compulsory for all workers, including
independent ones.
Second, we focus on the private non-financial non-primary sectors. The reasons are self-
evident. Employment in the public sector depends on different rationales that include macroe-
conomic stabilization, budget control and the supply of public services, and its funding relies
to a great deal on out-of-market sources (taxes). The agriculture sector in turn is highly subsi-
dized all over the EU and a credit crunch from the private sector may be overcome by financial
resources that we cannot observe at the micro level. Finally, credit flows within the financial
sector often respond to different factors than flows from banks to non-financial corporations.8
After a process of data cleansing, the final sample includes nearly 440,000 firms of which
about 200,000 have bank relationships.
2.4 Descriptive statistics
The firms included in the sample are predominantly micro and small enterprises, reflecting
the structure of the Italian industry. This distribution is consistent with Census data both in
8We also remove from our sample temp agencies, care givers and house cleaners. The reason for temp agencies
is that we cannot distinguish between the internal staff and the workers leased to other firms, and since temp
agency workers are also included within the employed workforce of the firms they are leased to, retaining temp
agencies would results in a duplication of flow records. Care givers and house cleaners, instead, are excluded as in
most cases they appear as self-employees if not individual firms. In the latter case, they would mistakenly increase
the number of actual firms. Moreover, when registered as employees, they are typically employed by households,
rather than by firms.
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terms of firms and employees (Figure 4). Over the sample period 2008-2012, the number of
employees declines by nearly 90,000 units, and the number of firms records a significant drop
too. These trends mimic the aggregate data from the National Institute of Statistics (Figure 5).
Temporary contracts—which account for more than 10 percent of all contracts (Table 1)—
could act as a buffer for firms to adjust to a credit shock in the very short term. The average
duration of temporary contracts in our sample is 9.4 months, and about two third of temporary
contracts end within a quarter.
Looking at the sub-sample of the indebted firms (i.e. those used in the empirical analysis),
the average firm has 6.3 employees (the median is 2 employees); two third of the firms are in the
service sector. In terms of the geographical distribution, firms are roughly equally distributed
across the seven provinces of Veneto, with Padua (20 percent) and Verona (19 percent) being
the two more populated provinces, while Venice (the regional capital) accounts for 16 percent
of firms. Finally, our sample includes mostly firms that borrow from one bank, while only
29 percent of firms obtain credit from more than one bank. The job loss for the average firm
is equal to 2.1 employees, while credit declined by 1.6 percent—see Table 1—consistent with
the evidence of a significant credit crunch in Italy following the Lehman’s collapse (Presbitero
et al., 2014; Cingano et al., 2016).9 However, the reduction in bank credit and employment was
heterogeneous, as one fourth of firms experienced a negative change in employment and credit
contracted for more than half of the firms in the sample.
3 Identification strategy
3.1 The empirical model
We test for the effect of credit supply on firm employment decisions estimating the following
model:
∆EMPLOYMENTit = β∆LOANit + δi + (γs(i) × τt) + (ηc(i) × τt) + (θp(i) × τt) + eit (1)
where the changes in total employment (∆EMPLOYMENTit) and in loans used by the banking
system ∆LOANit for firm i over the quarter t, are calculated as:
∆Xit =
Xit1 − Xit0
0.5× Xit1 + 0.5× Xit0
(2)
where Xt0 and Xt1 are, respectively, the values of employment and bank lending at the begin-
ning and the end of the quarter t. Variations calculated in this way are widely used because
9We measure loan growth using utilized loans rather than granted loans because the former captures rationing
in terms of both a reduction of granted loans (i.e. quantity side) and/or of an increase of interest rates (i.e. price
effects). However, Section 4.2 we test the robustness of our results using granted loans to measure loan growth.
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they have the advantage of being symmetric and bounded between −2 (exiters) and +2 (en-
trants) and they are equal to zero for firms that do not register any variation in employment or
lending within the quarter (Moscarini and Postel-Vinay, 2012; Haltiwanger et al., 2013; Siemer,
2016). Since labor decisions are sticky and the real effects of a financial shock could be visible
with some lag (Greenstone et al., 2014; Popov and Rocholl, 2017), in the baseline specifica-
tion we consider the average change in used loans over two quarters (formally, we calculate
∆LOANit and ∆LOANit−1 and we take the average change).10 Summary statistics for these
variables—for different job contracts and workers—are reported in Table 1.
The estimate of β gives the magnitude of the bank lending channel on employment dy-
namics. To assess the effect of bank lending on firm employment we face two main challenges.
First, the observed amount of bank credit is the equilibrium of demand for and supply of credit.
To deal with possible demand and productivity shocks we first add firm and time (quarter) ef-
fects, which allow for firm-specific time invariant demand shifters and for common global
shocks occurring at a quarterly frequency. Then, we saturate the model with more sophisti-
cated (2-digit) industry×quarter (γs(i)× τt) and province×quarter (θp(i)× τt) fixed effects, and
with a set of dummies that vary across quarters and firm class size (micro, small and medium-
large firms, ηc(i)× τt). The degree of granularity of these borrower fixed effects is such that our
identification hinges on the assumptions that: 1) firm unobserved heterogeneity which drives
labor demand (i.e. managerial risk appetite) is time invariant, and 2) all firms operating in the
same 2-digit industry, in the same province, and in the same class size face the same demand
or productivity shock in each quarter. Given that we consider the universe of firms in a rela-
tively homogeneous region, we believe that such granular fixed effects should be sufficient to
isolate time-varying unobserved demand shocks. That said, we run additional robustness test
allowing for more demanding firm cluster×time fixed effects to absorb time-varying borrower
demand shocks, using industry-province-size-quarter fixed effects (see Section 4.2).
Second, bank lending is endogenous to firms’ economic conditions and employment choices,
so that standard OLS estimates are likely to be biased.11 To isolate a credit supply shock from a
lower demand for credit we build on an instrumental variable (IV) approach similar to the one
proposed by Greenstone et al. (2014). We construct a time-varying firm-specific index of credit
supply (CSIit)—discussed in detail in the following section—and we use it as an instrument
for ∆LOANit. In this way, we can measure the firm-level ‘aggregate’ bank lending channel
10In Section 4.2 we will show that our key results hold if we consider exclusively the contemporaneous change
in loans, or the average change over three quarters.
11On the one hand, low performing firms can be more likely to demand/receive less credit and to contract the
labor force, inducing an upward bias in the OLS estimates. On the other hand, the OLS could be downward biased
because of ‘evergreening’ practices, so that firms under stress would reduce their employment, but at the same
time receive additional credit from their banks (Peek and Rosengren, 2005).
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(Jiménez et al., 2014), which takes into account general equilibrium effects (i.e. the possibility
that firms substitute for credit across banks).
3.2 Credit supply index
To isolate the exogenous component of credit supply we adopt a data-driven approach, in the
spirit of Greenstone et al. (2014). Specifically, we estimate the following equation that decom-
poses the contribution of demand and supply factors to bank lending growth at the national
level:
∆Lbpst = α+ δbt + γpst + ebpst (3)
where the outcome variable ∆Lbpst is the percentage change in outstanding business loans
by bank b, in province p, in sector s at time t; specifically we observe outstanding loans for
about 650 banks, 100 provinces (after excluding those located in Veneto) and main sectors of
activity (agriculture, manufacturing, construction, and private non-financial services)12; γpst is
a set of province-sector-quarter fixed effects that capture the variation in the change of lending
due to province-sector cycles, which can be interpreted as broadly measuring local demand;
the bank-time fixed effects δbt represent our parameters of interest and capture (nationwide)
bank lending policies. The identification of both γpst and δbt is guaranteed by the presence
of multiple banks in each province-sector market (i.e. multiple banks exposed to the same
demand) and the presence of each bank in multiple province-sector markets (i.e. multiple
markets exposed to the same bank supply conditions).
We then construct a time-varying firm-specific index of credit supply, aggregating the bank-
specific supply shocks estimated above with the beginning-of-the-period banks’ shares at the
firm level as weights. Specifically, the credit supply for the firm i at time t is:
CSIit =∑
b
wbit0 × δˆbt (4)
where δˆbt are the bank-time fixed effects estimated in equation 3 and wbit0 is the bank b market
share for firm i at the beginning of the sample period (end-2007).
By construction, CSIit captures the time-varying credit supply at the firm level and its
sources of variability are the substantial heterogeneity in changes in business lending across
banks and the variation in bank market shares across firms. To further convince the reader that
our measure of credit supply is actually correlated with the evolution of credit conditions in
Italy and with bank characteristics we provide a set of stylized facts.
12Provinces correspond to NUTS 3 Eurostat classification (a geography entity similar to U.S. counties) and, ac-
cording to the supervisory authority, they represent the “relevant” market in banking (see also Guiso et al., 2004).
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First, we show that, at the nationwide level, the evolution of bank lending policies mimics
quite well the growth rate of business loans; the correlation is stronger in the first part of the
crisis and weaker in more recent years (Figure 6, panel a); the latter pattern might be due to the
prevalence of demand factors in the second part of the crisis as main drivers of loan growth
rate. More interestingly, from a microeconomic point of view, banks applying different condi-
tions in terms of access to credit are characterized by significant differences in loans dynamics.
Specifically, for each period we divide banks into two groups, depending on whether their es-
timated credit supply orientation (δˆbt) was below or above the median, and we examine credit
patterns for both groups: as expected, tight banks recorded more negative patterns than ease
ones (Figure 6, panel b). Next, we can see that there is significant variability in credit sup-
ply across banks, with the large contraction in the supply of credit around 2009 being driven
by banks with the lowest values of δˆbt (Figure 6, panel c).13 Finally, the time pattern of our
credit supply indicator is also consistent with other aggregate indicators measuring the credit
supply orientation. Specifically, in panel d) of Figure 6 we plot the (inverse of) CSI together
with: 1) the diffusion index from the ECB Bank Lending Survey on Italian banks,14 2) the share
of rationed firms as reported by a survey on firms maintained by the Bank of Italy, and 3) a
corporate credit rationing indicator developed by Burlon et al. (2016) using bank-firm matched
data. The chart shows that the credit supply index follows closely the evolution of bank lend-
ing standards and the ones of firm financing constraints; the correlation of the CSI with the
three measures of credit constraints varies between 0.5 and 0.6.
Second, our measure of credit supply shows the expected correlation with bank character-
istics. We run a set of bank-level regressions on the cross section of banks, taking the average
of individual nationwide bank lending policies δˆbt over the period 2008-2012 as the dependent
variables and a set of bank characteristics measured at end-2007 as explanatory variables. The
worsening in credit supply conditions was higher for larger banks and those with larger fund-
ing gap (measured with the deposit-to-loan ratio) and with lower capital, consistent with the
fact that those banks were likely more exposed to the liquidity drought in interbank markets
and, more generally, to the financial turmoil (Table 2).
The exogeneity of CSIit relies on the two terms wbit0 and δˆbt. As for the first term, our
assumption is that the bank market shares at the firm level, once we have controlled for firm-
13Moreover, data show that the large drop in credit supply conditions from the beginning of the financial crisis
on was mostly concentrated among large banks, consistent with the fact that those banks were more exposed to the
liquidity drought in interbank markets.
14The “diffusion indexes” reflects subjective assessments of the lender on the relative importance of demand
and supply factors in explaining the lending patterns. Technically, the diffusion index is the (weighted) difference
between the share of banks reporting that credit standards have been tightened and the share of banks reporting
that they have been eased.
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fixed effects, are not correlated with the employment trend at the firm level. Though this is a
reasonable assumption, one may still have some concerns. For instance, one could think that
bank business model may play a role. In that case, large banks could specialize in lending
to large firms that are more exposed to the economic cycle (thus experiencing a decrease in
employment) and if those same banks also restricted credit supply more than other players,
then a correlation between our credit supply indicator and firm employment growth would be
spurious. In order to address this issue we include in the specification industry×quarter and
class size×quarter fixed effects. As our parameter of interest (β in equation 1) is fairly stable
(see Section 4.1), we argue that the problem discussed above is not likely to be an issue in our
case. Moreover, as shown in Table 3 on balancing properties, the exposure to credit shocks at
the firm level in our sample period (obtained averaging CSIit over the period 2008-2012) is not
significantly correlated (both from a statistical and economic point of view) to firm size at the
beginning-of-the-period.
As far as the second term is concerned, bank-time fixed effects δˆbt are exogenous by con-
struction since they are purged of unobserved province-sector-quarter factors and it is rather
implausible that unobserved effects at the firm level are able to affect nationwide banks’ lend-
ing policies. However, our identification assumption can be violated if banks with negative
supply shocks were more likely to grant credit to firms that were hit more by the crisis. This
may occur if, even in the same province-sector cluster, some banks can specialize into lending
to firms with a specific demand for credit, since they rely on different product markets (i.e.
more productive firms). In that case, the estimated bank-time fixed effects δˆbt could capture a
demand effect rather than a pure supply effect. Alternatively, it could be argued that there is
an endogenous sorting between firms and banks, with weak banks lending to weak firms. In
both cases we should observe some correlation between credit supply and firm characteristics.
However, summary statistics reported in Table 3 shows that there is no systematic correlation
between the size of the exposure to the credit supply shocks and a set of firm characteris-
tics, such as size, financial dependence, banking relationships, leverage, bad credit history,
geographical location, and sector of activity. The first five columns report summary statistics
of firm beginning-of-the-period characteristics by quintile of CSIit, averaged over the period
2008-2012 while the last column simplifies this information reporting the correlation between
these pairs of variables. It turns out that firm characteristics are well balanced with respect
to the average exposure to the credit shock during our temporal window. Moreover, for the
sub-sample of firms for which we have balance sheet information, we can extend this exercise
and show that the instrument is not correlated with labor productivity, leverage and riskiness,
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which could be taken as different proxies for firm quality (see Section 5).15
Our approach depart from Greenstone et al. (2014) along several dimensions that reinforce
the exogeneity of the instrument.16 First, one may argue that banks differentiate their policies
over the territory and that local lending policies are influenced by local economic conditions.
To address this concern, we estimate equation 1 dropping the Veneto provinces, so that we
exclude the effects of demand and supply factors in this region from the calculation of bank-
time fixed effects.17 Moreover, it is worth noting that according to lending survey pursued by
the Bank of Italy, there is no evidence that banks applied different lending policies across the
four Italian macro-regions (see Figure A1 in the appendix). Second, we translate bank-time
fixed effects at the firm rather than at the aggregate (i.e. county) level. This approach further
reinforces the exogeneity of the instruments because while one may argue that unobservable
shock in a county may affect (nationwide) lending policies of banks (especially when the local
market is sufficiently large with respect to the national credit market of a certain bank), this
is less plausible in case of unobservable shock at the firm level. Third, our data allows the
estimation of time-varying bank fixed effects after having controlled for province-sector-time
unobserved factors, while Greenstone et al. (2014) control only for counties-time unobserved
factors. This means that we are able to account from bank-specific demand shocks that may
occur whenever banks specialize in lending to certain provinces and/or sectors and they both
perform differently from others. Fourth, in Italy government interventions in favor of the
banking system has been very limited, contrarily to what has happened in the U.S. and in other
European countries. This implies that bank lending policies were not affected by constraints
imposed by the government as conditions to receive public support and, therefore, that our
estimates are not affected by this potential source of bias.
15While, by definition, the set of observables cannot include all possible firm characteristics, we argue that it is
difficult to think at firm characteristics which are correlated with the credit supply index while being orthogonal to
the variables listed in Tables 3 and 14.
16An alternative identification strategy is the one proposed by Amiti and Weinstein (2017), who identify the
bank shocks (i.e. time varying bank fixed effects) through a regression on the dynamic of loans at the firm level,
exploiting information from the sub-sample of firms who borrow from multiple banks. However we believe that
their approach is less suitable for our case since the fraction of firms who have multiple lending relationships
varies a lot with firm size: in our data, for example, more than 90 percent of medium and large firms have multiple
relationships in contrast to about 30 percent for micro-firms. Therefore the identification of bank fixed effects with
a regression at the firm level is arguably less reliable with our sample that include a large number of micro and
small firms.
17The exclusion of Veneto provinces from the estimation of bank lending policies leads to the exclusion of only
one bank (accounting for less than 0.1 percent of loans granted to all firms residing in Veneto), for which we were
not able to estimate the national lending policy. Therefore, this strategy does not affect the representativeness of our
sample, while it strongly reinforces the exogeneity of the instrument. It is also worth noting that Veneto represents
about 8 percent of total loans granted by the median bank active in the region.
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4 Results
4.1 Main results
To help illustrate the impact of the credit supply, Figure 7 plots the employment patterns for
firms classified in two groups, depending on whether they were exposed over the period 2008-
2012 to tighter or easier lending policies (i.e. CSI below or above the median). More specif-
ically, the plotted values are the residuals (average of the two groups) of a regression of the
logarithm of employees on firm and quarter fixed effects, so that the residuals are on average
equal to zero and their time patterns show the dynamics of employment for the two groups.
The two lines suggest that less favorable lending conditions are associated with a decrease in
employment and with a divergent dynamic with respect to firms who experienced a better
access to credit. The following regression tables statistically substantiate this visual evidence.
Table 4 reports the 2SLS robust estimates of the baseline model for the whole sample of
firms, including firm and quarter fixed effects (column 1), and time-varying industry, class
size, and province fixed effects (columns 2 to 4).
The top panel reports the first-stage estimates, which show that, as expected, the CSI is
positively associated with the change in used loans and the coefficients is precisely estimated.
The relevance of the instrument is further confirmed by the value of the first-stage F-statistic,
which ranges between 156 and 180, well above the critical value of 10 suggested by Staiger and
Stock (1997) to avoid the weak instrument bias.
The second-stage results—reported in the bottom panel—confirm the existing evidence
about the negative effect of a credit supply shock on employment (Chodorow-Reich, 2014;
Bentolila et al., 2016), since the change in used loans has a significant and economically large
effect on the variation in employment at the firm level. Comparing the four different specifi-
cation shows that adding fixed effects reduces the employment effect of the credit crunch, as
they are capturing time-varying borrower-specific demand and productivity shocks. In par-
ticular, the point estimate of the coefficient on ∆LOAN are broadly stable 0.44 in columns 1 to
3, when adding time-varying industry and class size fixed effects, but decreases to 0.36 when
time-varying industry, size and province fixed effects are jointly added in the model (column
4).
From now on, we will take the specification of column 4 as our baseline. The point estimate
of the bank lending channel is 0.36, meaning that a 10 percent contraction in bank lending over
two quarters translates into a 3.6 percent reduction in employment.18 In relative terms, one
18This elasticity is roughly twice as large as the one estimated by Cingano et al. (2016) on a sample of larger
Italian firms, but over a different time span, confirming that focusing on the universe of firms helps providing a
more precise estimate of the employment effect of a credit restriction.
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standard deviation of the predicted change of used loan explains 18% of the standard deviation
of employment.
In order to have aggregate evidence of the impact, we calculate the share of the change of
employment in our temporal window that can be attributed to the credit crunch, bearing in
mind the caveat that there are general equilibrium effects that cannot be taken into account
when extrapolating microeconomic estimate at the aggregate level (Chodorow-Reich, 2014).
In our case, for example, results are obtained conditional on firms having bank debt, so that
our estimates are silent on possible demand shift to firms non depending on bank credit. In
our sample, the credit extended to firms diminishes by 1.6 percent while employment by 2.1
percent (see Table 1), both on a quarterly base. With simple algebra, it is easy to show that the
credit drop attributable to the lending supply orientation over the period 2008-2012 explains
about 28 percent of the employment loss.
Overall our results indicate a quite large effect of the credit crunch on employment. These
findings are also roughly comparable, in magnitude, to those estimated by Bentolila et al. (2016)
for Spain and Chodorow-Reich (2014) for the U.S. However, compared to these exercises—
which are generally focused on medium and large enterprises—our analysis is less subject
to external validity concerns related to the representativeness of the data, since our sample
include micro and small firms and covers almost the universe of private non-financial firms
and employment of the region.19
4.2 Robustness
We test the robustness of our baseline results running a battery of additional tests. Results are
showed in Table 5. First, to address the concerns that our set of borrower fixed effects might
not fully absorb demand and productivity shock, we saturate our model with more demand-
ing fixed effects. We start by interacting the quarter dummies with more restrictive borrower
cells (industry×size, industry×province, and province×size), allowing for time-varying de-
mand to be the same not only across industries, class size and provinces, but also withing their
two-way combinations (columns 1-3). Then, in the spirit of recent works that has to deal with
a prevalence of single bank-firm relationships (Abuka et al., 2015; Auer and Ongena, 2016; De-
gryse et al., 2016), we fully saturate the model with firm cluster×time—where the firm cluster
is composed by all firms in the same industry, province, and class size—which are as close as
we can get to quarterly firm fixed effects (column 4). Interestingly, the coefficient on ∆LOAN
is not only precisely estimated, but it remains remarkably stable ranging between 0.34 and
19The average firm size is nearly 3,000 in Chodorow-Reich (2014) and about 25 in Bentolila et al. (2016), while in
our case is around 6 as we are able to observe the universe of firms.
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0.37 in columns 1-3. The inclusion of the four-way fixed effects does not significantly alter the
magnitude of the estimated credit effect on employment, suggesting that there is no additional
unobserved heterogeneity driving our estimates. Hence, we will use the baseline set of fixed
effects showed in Table 4 (column 4) throughout the rest of the analysis.
In columns 5 we show that our results are robust to clustering the standard errors to allow
for intra-group correlation in the error term at the province-industry-class size level: the stan-
dard error only marginally increases while the coefficient of interest remains highly significant.
Similar results (available from the authors upon request) are obtained using different levels of
clustering.
In column 6 we restrict the sample to firms which have a total debt above 75,000 euros
throughout the entire sample period, to avoid potential biases arising from the change in the
threshold in our sample period. We find that the coefficient on ∆LOAN slightly increases to
0.49, but it is still precisely estimated.
One could argue that employment dynamics could be affected also by the housing net worth
channel, which can compress demand because of a direct wealth effect or tighter borrowing
constraints, through a fall in collateral values. This channel has been responsible for a sig-
nificant drop in employment in the U.S. during the financial crisis (Adelino et al., 2015; Mian
and Sufi, 2014) and it could also be important in our set-up, because of high home ownership
rates in Italy (76 percent of households own their house in Veneto) and because, differently
from most of the literature, we deal with entrepreneurs of micro firms, who are likely to post
their house as a collateral for business loans. However, the housing boom-and-bust cycle in
Italy has been quite limited, and even more so in Veneto (Figure A2 in the annex). In any case,
to further avoid any confounding factor affecting our estimates, we add time-varying house
prices at the municipality level and we find that the inclusion of house prices does not change
the coefficients on the loan variable (column 7).
Finally, we do some robustness exercise on the ∆LOAN variable. Rather than taking the
average change in used loans over two quarters, in columns 7 and 8 we consider exclusively
the contemporaneous change (at time t) and the average changes over three quarters (t, t− 1,
and t− 2), respectively.20 We still find evidence that a contraction in the credit supply reduces
employment and, as expected, the effect is smaller when looking at the contemporaneous ef-
fects and increases allowing for more lags.
20The construction of the instrument is modified accordingly.
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4.3 Job contract heterogeneity
As a second step of our analysis we zoom in on the composition of the labor force adjustment,
to assess in which way firms changed their workforce. Given that we cannot reconstruct the
stock of workers by type of contracts and by worker characteristics for all firms, we estimate
equation 1 taking as dependent variables the quarterly change of employment at the firm level
for a given job or worker characteristic, scaled by the average stock of all firm’s workers over
the quarter.21 Therefore, differently from the baseline model, the dependent variable is not a
growth rate but a contribution to the aggregate (at the firm level) growth rate. This means that
the estimated coefficients cannot be interpreted as elasticities, but they need to be scaled by the
relative share of the job contracts/workers. Lacking that information in our sample, we use the
aggregates shares at the regional level, as compiled by from the National Institute of Statistics
(‘Labour Force Survey’), in order to provide an economic interpretation of our findings, see
Table 1.
At first, we consider open-ended and temporary contracts—which include fixed term di-
rect hires, project workers, temporary agency workers, trainees and apprentices, and seasonal
workers—to test whether firms react to more binding financing constraints by reducing the
use of temporary contracts more than open-ended ones (Table 6, top-left panel). We find that
the employment adjustment happens primarily through variation of temporary contracts, con-
sistent with the idea that firms use mostly fixed-term workers to absorb employment volatility
(Caggese and Cuñat, 2008) and with lower termination costs for temporary contracts.22 The
coefficient on ∆LOAN is positive and statistically significant for both type of contracts, even
though there is an over-representation of temporary workers among dismissed employees, as
also discussed by Bentolila et al. (2016) for Spain. Although temporary contracts account for
only slightly more than one tenth of total contracts in the workforce (Table 1), they bear al-
most half of the effect of the change in credit supply (0.191/0.363 = 0.53, where 0.363 is the
estimated coefficient of credit supply variation for the entire workforce—see Table 4, column
4).
To better understand the employment dynamics following the credit crunch, we differen-
tiate between inflows and outflows and we find that our results are mostly driven by the dy-
namics of outflows, which are higher for firms more exposed to the credit supply shock, even
21In other words, the dependent variable is calculated as the ratio between the job flows for a given category of
contracts or workers—which we retrieve from PLANET—and the average stock of total workers (0.5×Xit1 + 0.5×
Xit0 , as defined at the denominator of equation 2).
22Since firms do not have to pay dismissal costs upon termination of temporary contracts, they typically employ
temporary workers as a buffer stock, to deal with expected or unexpected fluctuations in demand or in financial
conditions. Indeed, recourse to temporary contracts is known to be more cyclical than the use of open-ended
contracts (García Serrano, 1998; Goux et al., 2001).
20
though the effect on inflows is also marginally significant (Table 6, bottom-left panel). Then,
within outflows, we differentiate across the possible reasons of the exit and we find evidence
that outflows are exclusively due to non-renewal of expired contracts, while there is no evi-
dence that the adjustment works through dismissal or quit (Table 6, top-right panel). Finally,
we look at the transitions across job contracts, considering both contract type and time sched-
ule. We find evidence that firms more exposed to negative credit shocks are are less likely to
transform temporary contracts into open-ended ones, while it seems that financing constraints
do not affect firm policies in terms of transition between part-time and full-time jobs (Table 6,
bottom-right panel).
4.4 Worker heterogeneity
Looking at the workers’ characteristics, we first differentiate across three levels of education—
low (at most compulsory education), medium (at most upper secondary education), and high
(tertiary education), based on the ISCED classification—and we observe that firms which have
experienced a reduction in the supply of credit reacted reducing mostly the employment of
low- and medium-educated workers, while the effect for the high-educated ones is smaller
and only marginally significant (Table 7, top panel). In particular, using the relative shares
reported in Table 1, the elasticity of employment to credit supply for low-educated workers is
higher than the average and equal to 0.48 (= 0.186/0.387). The corresponding elasticities are
equal to 0.31 and 0.19 for medium- and high-educated workers, respectively. In other words,
changes in employment within low-educated workers account for more than half of the total
effect of ∆LOAN (0.186/0.363 = 0.51), even though low-educated workers account for less
than 40 percent of the workforce.
Education may not perfectly overlap with the skill content of jobs; moreover, administra-
tive data may record with errors self-reported information as the level of education. Therefore,
we replicate the analysis by skill level directly looking at the skill content of each occupation
(Table 7, bottom panel).23 The results based on this different measure of skill level are stronger
than those based on the education level: the effect is predominantly concentrated on low-skill
occupations, which represent about 15 percent of jobs, but account for about 43 percent of the
total effect of the credit contraction (0.156/0.363 = 0.43). The differential effect across skills and
education is consistent with the theory of skill upgrading, which indicates that, in a downturn,
firms want to dismiss less skilled, less profitable workers first (Reder, 1955; Hershbein and
23Specifically, we look at the ISCO classification of occupations and we consider low-skilled those employed in
elementary occupations and services and sales workers; clerical support workers, craft and related trades workers
and plant and machine operators, and assemblers have an intermediate level of skills; finally, managers, profes-
sionals and technicians are highly-skilled workers.
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Kahn, 2016).
Then, we assess whether firms adjusted their labor force differentiating across workers, de-
pending on their gender, age, and nationality. Our results—showed in Table 8—indicate that
the employment effect in response to a reduction in the supply of credit is concentrated among
women, foreign and younger workers. In particular, female workers represent around 40 per-
cent of total employment, but they account for 61 percent of the total change in employment.
Similarly, foreign workers are less the 10 percent of the labor force, but their employment
dynamics explains more than 24 percent of the total change in employment.24 There is also
evidence that younger people are more likely to feel the consequences of the credit crunch,
consistent with recent evidence showing that young workers are the most affected during re-
cessions (Forsythe, 2016). The under 30 contribute to slightly less than a third of the overall
employment effect, even though they represent less than 20 percent of the workforce.
Finally, in Table 9 we take advantage of the several dimensions in which we can slice our
data to measure the impact of the credit crunch on employment, conditional both on contract
type and worker education. We find that indeed firms adjusted their labor force in response
to a contraction in the supply of credit reducing temporary contracts and dismissing low- and
medium-educated workers. By contrast, high-educated workers have been able to insulate
themselves, even if hired with a temporary contracts. The effect on low-educated workers
with a temporary contract account for 32 percent of the total employment effect, even though
they represent less than 4 percent of the workforce. This share declines to 19 percent moving to
an open-ended contract (but they account for 33 percent of the workforce) and further down to
6 percent for a high-educated worker with an open-ended contract, which are 11 percent of the
workforce (the effect is not significant for high-educated workers with temporary contracts).
These results are consistent with the hypothesis that low-skilled individuals suffer most from
recessions and with the empirical evidence on Germany discussed by Hochfellner et al. (2016).
Overall, the results of our analysis indicates that the combination of low-education and tem-
porary contract identifies the profile of workers who has been hit by the credit crunch, while
high education makes the difference between temporary and open-ended contracts almost ir-
relevant.
24We cannot exclude that some of the penalty for foreign workers comes from sheer discrimination. For instance,
it has been documented that economic downturns favor racial prejudice and lead to worse labor market outcomes
for minorities (Johnston and Lordan, 2016).
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4.5 Firm heterogeneity
As a fourth step, we explore possible heterogeneous effect across different firms.25 First, we are
interested in assessing whether the employment response to a credit supply shock differ across
firm size, given that SMEs are more likely to be financially constrained, have limited access to
alternative sources of external finance, and depend more on bank credit than large firms (see
Figure 3), so that the real effects of credit shocks is likely to be larger (Gertler and Gilchrist,
1994; Beck et al., 2008; Buera et al., 2015; Duygan-Bump et al., 2015; Cingano et al., 2016). The
estimation of equation 1 for the three sub-samples of micro (less then 10 employees), small
(between 10 and 49 employees) and medium-large (50 or more employees) firms shows that
our results hold only for micro and small firms (Table 10, left panel). By contrast, the coefficient
on ∆LOAN is not statistically significant in the sample of medium-large firms: the coefficient
is positive but imprecisely estimated, and the first-stage F-statistic suggests that there are weak
identification problems, possible due to the small sample size and to the capacity of large firms
to negotiate their credit terms with the banks, while small firms are more likely to be exposed
to (nationwide) banks’ credit policies.
When splitting our sample across sectors, we find that employment reacts to credit shocks
only in services, while there is no evidence that industrial firms reduce employment in re-
sponse to a credit crunch (Table 10, right panel). This result may be explained by the wider use
of open-ended contracts and on the larger firm size (and, therefore, on the lower dependence
on bank credit) of industrial firms compared to the one in the service sector.26
To shed light on the mechanisms through which financial shocks could affect employment
decisions we exploit a set of firm financial characteristics available in our data. If banks play
a crucial role in addressing firm financing needs, then a sudden drop of credit supply should
impact disproportionately more on firms relying more on bank credit, having less flexibility in
the use of granted credit lines, and having weaker relationships with their lenders.
First, we examine whether firms that were more indebted at the beginning of our sample
25We report all results using sub-samples, but we obtain similar findings estimating the equation 1 on the whole
sample and interacting ∆LOAN by firm characteristics (e.g. size and sector).
26One may argue that the sources of heterogeneity discussed so far have a strong overlap, meaning that we are
observing the same firm employment decision (the worker which has been dismissed) from different angles (a
worker of small firm in the service sector, with a temporary contract and low education). To reassure the skeptical
reader that job contracts and education really matters for employment outcomes during a credit crunch over and
above the effect of firm characteristics, we run our model on different sub-samples according to sectors and firm
size. Table A1—reported in the annex—shows that the effect of the credit crunch on temporary contracts holds
even within firms in services, as well as within micro and small firms. The adjustment on open-ended contract is
also concentrated in services and in small firms, but the size of the elasticity is rather small. Similarly, annex Table
A2 confirms that the effect of the credit crunch on the occupation of less educated workers survives within micro
and small firms and in the service sector. Similarly, it is worth noting that also differences across age, gender, and
nationality persist within sectors and firm class size (results not shown but available upon request).
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period suffered more from the tightening of credit conditions. We consider a firm as more
(less) exposed to bank credit if its debt per employee is higher (lower) than the one of similar
firms (i.e. we compare firms in the same industry, province and class size). This choice makes
it possible to account for different production functions across industries and to avoid having
results that overlap with those showed before. We find that employment reacts relatively more
to credit supply restrictions in firms that are more levered (Table 11, left panel). Second, we
find that the elasticity of employment to credit is higher for firms that at the beginning of our
sample period were using granted credit lines more intensively, as those firms are less able to
cope with negative shocks using existing credit lines (Table 11, middle panel). These results
are consistent with the idea that firms with less financial slack find it more costly to engage in
labor hoarding when exposed to a financial shock and therefore react to the shock adjusting
the labor force (Giroud and Mueller, 2016).
Finally, we explore the possibility that the extent of job disruption following a credit supply
shock depends on the strength of the bank-firm relationship. We consider the number of bank
relationships, differentiating between firms which borrow exclusively from one bank during
the sample period and firms with multiple lending banks. We find positive and significant
elasticities in the two sub-samples, even though the point estimate for firms with multiple
bank relationships is twice as large as that for firms with one bank (Table 11, right panel),
suggesting that stronger lending relationships contribute to mitigate the effect of the credit
crunch on employment outcomes. Thus, our results lend support to recent evidence showing
that Italian firms that borrowed from fewer banks suffered a smaller contraction of bank credit
and a lower increase in lending rates following the Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy (Gobbi and
Sette, 2014; Gambacorta and Mistrulli, 2014).
5 Extensions
5.1 Adjustment at the extensive and intensive margins
So far our analysis has considered the effects of a financial shock at the extensive and intensive
margins together. However, understanding if the aggregate employment effect is driven by
a downsizing of the workforce in active firms or by firm closures has important implications
for the understanding the crisis and of the mechanisms of workforce management within the
firm. To shed some light on the margins of adjustment we first re-estimate our model on a sub-
sample that excludes the firms that close down in a given quarter. Specifically, in each quarter
we consider all active firms that can adjust at the intensive margin and the ones that will close
in future quarters, but that can still adjust their workforce in the quarters before closure. Then,
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to look at the extensive margin we estimate a linear probability model for the likelihood that a
firm closes its activity in a given quarter.
Our results, reported in Table 12, indicate that the adjustment to a contraction in credit
supply has happened both at the intensive and extensive margins, in line with the evidence
on Spain (Bentolila et al., 2016). When we drop from the sample firm closures, we still find a
precisely identified elasticity, even though its magnitude is smaller, as a 10 percent contraction
in credit translates into a 2.5 percent fall in employment. In addition, the adjustment at the
intensive margin falls disproportionately on temporary workers, which account for about three
quarters of the fall in employment (the effect is about 50 percent in the whole sample). Hence,
part of the effect on open-ended contracts is due to firm exit, consistent with the presence
of labor market rigidities and high dismissal costs for open-ended contracts. Finally, the last
column shows that a shortfall in the supply of credit increases the likelihood of firm exit. This
effect is economically meaningful: considering the average contraction of bank credit of 1.6
percent in the sample period, the estimated coefficient implies a 0.1 percent increase in the
probability that a firm closes down, which accounts for about one seventh of the average exit
rate (Table 1).
Given that the composition of the adjustment at the intensive margin looks different that
the overall effect, we replicate the analysis discussed in Section 4.4 to look at the role of worker
heterogeneity by education in the restricted sample that excludes firm closures. The results
are qualitatively similar, but stronger than those obtained in the whole sample, suggesting
that the reduction in employment due to firm exit has been relatively more homogeneous
across contracts and workers than the one that involved active firms. In particular, firms which
experienced a reduction in the supply of credit, but did not close, reduced employment mostly
among low- and medium-educated workers (Table 13, top panel). Then, considering together
contract type and education clearly reinforces one of our main findings. The intensive margin
adjustment has exclusively affected less educated workers with temporary contracts, while
high-educated temporary workers—which represent about a fifth of all temporary contracts—
have not been hit by the financial shock (Table 13, bottom panels).
5.2 Matching firm balance sheets
To have a better sense of which are the firms that reduce employment more in response to a
financial shock, in this section we show a set of additional results estimated on a sub-sample
of larger firms for which it is possible to obtain and match balance-sheet information from
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the CADS database.27 While the availability of balance-sheet information allows for a bet-
ter understanding of the mechanisms through which a financial shock propagates to the real
economy, the match with the CADS data comes at the non-trivial costs of loosing one of the
key feature of our analysis—the coverage of the universe of firms, including small and mi-
cro enterprises—and moving from a quarterly to a yearly frequency in the empirical analysis.
In particular, in this (smaller) sample the average (median) firm size is 16.4 (4.8) employees,
nearly three times the respective values in the whole sample. Nonetheless, thanks to balance
sheet information, we can extend the analysis of the exogeneity of the instrument looking at
its balancing properties, in the same vein of what done in Table 3. Additional results reinforce
our identification strategy, given that the credit supply index is not systematically correlated
with labor productivity, capital intensity, age, leverage and riskiness (see Table 14).
Moving from a quarterly to a yearly frequency does not significantly alter our baseline
results: the coefficient on ∆LOAN on the whole sample goes from 0.363 to 0.347 (compare Table
4, column 4, and Table 15, column 1). However, the coefficient is significantly smaller (and
equal to 0.095) when considering the restricted sample of firms with balance sheet information.
The large drop in the elasticity of employment to credit supply further confirms the importance
of focusing on the universe of firms to have a precise estimate of the employment effect of a
financial shock (Table 15, columns 1 and 2). By contrast, if the analysis is limited to a sample
of relatively large firms—as in most of the empirical literature so far—the employment effect
is likely to be under-estimated. To put our analysis in the context of the extant literature, Table
15 reports also the effect on capital accumulation. Consistently with recent evidence on the
real effects of large credit contractions (Acharya et al., 2016; Amiti and Weinstein, 2017; Bottero
et al., 2016; Cingano et al., 2016; Degryse et al., 2016), we find a negative impact of credit supply
on investment, which—as expected—is stronger than the one on labor.
Having being assured that the restricted sample provides results that are consistent with
the ones on the universe of (indebted) firms and with the recent evidence on European firms,
in Table 16 we look at what firms reacted more to the financial shock. First, we separate young
from old firms splitting the sample around the median age within each industry, province and
class size cluster. We find that the effects on employment are limited to relatively young firms,
in line with the hypothesis that these firms have higher borrowing needs and therefore are
more exposed to a financial shock (Buera et al., 2015; Siemer, 2016).
Second, we can differentiate between low- and high-risk firms on the basis of the firm credit
27The Company Accounts Data Service (CADS, “Centrale dei Bilanci” in Italian) is a proprietary database, man-
aged by the Cerved Group, that includes annual balance sheets and income statements for almost all of the Italian
limited companies. Specifically, from CADS we draw information on value added, tangible and intangible assets,
the z-score (a measure of credit risk), the financial situation, the number of employees and age.
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rating at December 2007. For each firm, the CADS database contains the Altman (1968) z-score,
which indicates the likelihood of default within two years. This indicator is computed on the
basis of multiple financial ratios and it is widely used by Italian banks to assess credit risk.
The z-score takes integer values ranging from 1 (the safest firm) to 9 (the firm most likely to
default) and we split the sample around the sample median. Our results show that ex-ante
riskier firms are more sensitive to a credit crunch, with an estimated elasticity which is about
three times larger than the one of low-risk firms.
Third, to better understand how firm balance sheet can propagate the effect of financial
shocks, we delve into the role of corporate leverage, defined as the ratio of financial debt over
financial debt and equity. Again, we split the sample at the median of each variable at Decem-
ber 2007. We find that the role of leverage is much stronger in this sub-sample larger firms
than in the whole sample. Specifically, the elasticity of employment to the supply of credit is
almost four times higher in high-indebted than in low-indebted firms. Overall, our results are
in line with those of Bentolila et al. (2016) for Spanish firms, and complement what recently
found by Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2015), who show that Southern European firms that entered the
sovereign debt crisis with higher debt overhang have contracted investment relatively more
than others.
Finally, to substantiate the hypothesis that the global financial crisis had a cleansing ef-
fect through firms’ workforce management, we look at whether ex-ante less productive firms
are more likely to reduce employment. By measuring labor productivity as value added per
employee as of December 2007, we find that a 10 percent reduction in the supply of credit
translated in a reduction of employment of 1.8 percent in low-productive firms—twice the
effect estimated for the average firms—while there is no statistically significant effect in high-
productive firms. This result is consistent with recent evidence on the U.S. showing that less
productive establishments are more likely to exit during the Great Recession (Foster et al.,
2016).
6 Conclusions
The recent literature on finance and labor has showed that firms reduce employment in re-
sponse to a credit crunch. Our analysis takes advantage of a novel dataset on job contracts and
labor market flows for the universe of firms in a large Italian region to look at the within-firm
personnel dynamics and identify which kind of workers are more likely to be laid off, depend-
ing on firm, worker, and job contract characteristics. To identify the employment effects of
the credit crunch, our identification strategy relies on loan level data to build a firm-specific
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time-varying measure of credit supply restriction and to control for time-varying demand and
productivity shocks using a granular set of borrower fixed effects.
Our baseline results confirm that financially constrained firms reduced employment and
the point estimate indicates that the elasticity of employment to a credit supply shock is 0.36.
This result is due to an adjustment at the intensive margin (the elasticity excluding firm clo-
sures is 0.25), but also to a higher probability of firm closure in response to a reduction in the
supply of credit. The aggregate effect, based on our estimates, is economically meaningful
since the contraction in bank lending is able to explain about one fourth of the reduction in
employment. In addition, we show that the adjustment has been differentiated across firms,
workers and job contracts. In particular, the credit crunch has mainly affected less educated
and less skilled workers with temporary contracts, suggesting that firms have adjusted to the
credit supply shock in a way which is consistent with a skill upgrading of the labor force,
even though this strategy has been significantly affected by labor market regulation. Finally,
we show that the employment effects of the credit crunch have been heterogeneous across
firms: smaller, younger and less productive firms, and those with higher debt overhang and
weaker bank-firm relationships have been more vulnerable to the (negative) impact of the
credit crunch on employment.
Our results inform the current debate on the real effects of financial shocks along differ-
ent dimensions. First, we show that large credit contractions have distributional effects, as
some demographic groups have been more affected than others by the global financial crisis.
Second, our findings confirm that firm balance sheet matters for the propagation of shocks to
the real economy, with more levered firms reducing employment more when facing financing
constraints. Finally, our analysis indicates that financial shocks could play a cleansing role and
foster aggregate productivity gains, given that unskilled workers and jobs in less productive
firms are more likely to be hit by the credit crunch.
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Figures
Figure 1: External validity: firm distribution across size and sectors in Veneto and Italy
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Figure 2: External validity: bank penetration and lending in Veneto and Italy
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Figure 3: Bank financing in Italy across firm size
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Figure 4: Sample representativeness, comparison with the Census
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Figure 5: Sample representativeness, dynamics of firms and employment
1480000
1500000
1520000
1540000
1560000
Nu
m
be
r o
f e
m
plo
ye
es
398000
399000
400000
401000
402000
403000
Nu
m
be
r o
f fi
rm
s
2008:Q4 2009:Q4 2010:Q4 2011:Q4 2012:Q4
Number of firms Number of employees
(a) Sample, non-financial private sector (deseasonalized
data)
1550000
1600000
1650000
1700000
Nu
m
be
r o
f e
m
plo
ye
es
450000
455000
460000
465000
Nu
m
be
r o
f fi
rm
s
2008:Q1 2008:Q4 2009:Q3 2010:Q2 2011:Q1 2011:Q4 2012:Q3
Number of firms Number of employees
(b) Universe, total economy (Source: ISTAT, RFL)
Notes: elaborations on data from PLANET, ASIA and ISTAT (‘Labour Force Survey’).
35
Figure 6: Bank lending policies and credit supply index: descriptive statistics
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Figure 7: Credit supply and employment dynamics
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Tables
Table 1: Summary statistics
The table reports the summary statistics for ∆EMPLOYMENT for all workers and for different characteristics of contracts and
workers, the average change in firm borrowing over two quarters (∆LOAN), the credit supply index (CSI), and a binary variable
identifying firms that closed their activity in a given quarter t, but were active in t− 1 (EXIT). The sample is the one used in the
empirical analysis, made by the universe of firms, conditional on having bank debt. The change in employment for temporary
contracts includes fixed term direct hires, project workers, temporary agency workers, trainees and apprentices, and seasonal
workers. Education level are defined as low (at most compulsory education), medium (at most upper secondary education), and
high (tertiary education) education, based on the ISCED classification. The skill content of each occupation is defined as low
(elementary occupations and services and sales workers), medium (clerical support workers, craft and related trades workers
and plant and machine operators, and assemblers) and high (managers, professionals and technicians), based on the ISCO classi-
fication. The last column report the share of employment at the beginning of the period (end 2007) for different characteristics of
contract and workers: these data are taken from the ‘Labour Force Survey’ of the National Institute of Statistics. For temporary
and open-ended contracts the table reports also the decomposition across education levels.
Variable Mean St. Dev. Share in total
employment
(%)
∆EMPLOYMENT - Total -0.0211 0.2610 100.0
∆EMPLOYMENT - Open-ended -0.0173 0.1890 88.7
low-education -0.0080 0.1000 3.9
medium-education -0.0075 0.1020 5.4
high-education -0.0016 0.0355 2.0
∆EMPLOYMENT - Temporary -0.0039 0.1660 11.3
low-education -0.0016 0.1060 32.8
medium-education -0.0017 0.0993 45.0
high-education -0.0006 0.0464 11.0
∆EMPLOYMENT - Under 30 -0.0025 0.1080 17.9
∆EMPLOYMENT - Over 30 -0.0186 0.2090 82.1
∆EMPLOYMENT - Male -0.0126 0.1690 59.9
∆EMPLOYMENT - Female -0.0085 0.1470 40.1
∆EMPLOYMENT - Italian -0.0179 0.2260 91.4
∆EMPLOYMENT - Foreign -0.0033 0.0919 8.6
∆EMPLOYMENT - Low-education -0.0098 0.1480 38.7
∆EMPLOYMENT - Medium-education -0.0088 0.1420 48.0
∆EMPLOYMENT - High-education -0.0022 0.0569 13.3
∆EMPLOYMENT - Low-skill -0.0042 0.1390 15.2
∆EMPLOYMENT - Medium-skill -0.0113 0.1500 49.3
∆EMPLOYMENT - High-skill -0.0056 0.0874 35.5
∆LOAN -0.0163 0.3151 .
CSI -0.0085 0.0404 .
EXIT 0.0066 0.0811 .
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Table 2: Credit supply and bank heterogeneity
The table reports the results of a set of OLS regressions at the bank level (in cross section) in which the dependent variable is the
average nationwide bank lending policies (δˆb) at the bank level over the sample period 2008-2012 and the explanatory bank-level
variables are measured as of end-2007. For the definition of δˆb see Section 3.2 and equation 3. Bank size is measured by the
logarithm of total bank assets; the funding gap is measured by the loans-to-deposits ratio; Tier 1 capital ratio is defined as Tier
1 capital over risk-weighted assets; and the share of NPLs is the ratio of non-performing loans over total loan. Robust standard
errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Dep. Var.: CSI at the bank level (average 2008-2012)
Bank size -0.0047*** -0.0014**
(0.0009) (0.0007)
Funding gap -0.0102*** -0.0085***
(0.0018) (0.0017)
Tier 1 capital ratio 0.0470*** 0.0383***
(0.0073) (0.0074)
Share of NPLs -0.0237 -0.0494
(0.0388) (0.0365)
Observations 536 536 536 536 536
R2 0.084 0.113 0.148 0.001 0.240
Table 3: Orthogonality conditions
The table reports the average values of a set of firm-specific variables (by row) for each quintile of the sample distribution of the
credit supply index (CSI). The % industry (services) is the share of firms in the industry (services) sector; the % main province is
the percentage of firms that is located in the main province (i.e. Verona); Utilized/granted credit is the ratio between the utilized
credit and total granted credit lines; Multi-banks is a dummy equal to one if the firm has multiple banking relationship and equal
to zero for firms borrowing from only one bank; NPLs is a dummy equal to one if the firm has non-performing loans at the
beginning of the sample (December 2007). For the definition of CSI see Section 3.2 and equation 4. The last column reports the
correlation between each of the row variables and the CSI in the whole sample
Quintile of exposure to credit supply shock Correlation with
1 2 3 4 5 credit supply (CSI)
Credit supply index (CSI) -0.040 -0.018 -0.007 0.000 0.022 1,000
% industry 0.323 0.329 0.342 0.278 0.298 -0.024
% services 0.677 0.671 0.658 0.722 0.702 0.024
# employees 4.578 7.728 9.308 4.825 3.919 -0.007
% main province 0.236 0.238 0.222 0.173 0.144 -0.055
Debt per employee 128,460 175,598 164,244 165,833 114,852 -0.003
Utilized/granted credit 0.194 0.311 0.396 0.237 0.194 0.003
Multi-banks 0.870 0.855 0.823 0.987 0.884 -0.017
NPLs 0.035 0.032 0.048 0.044 0.041 0.014
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Table 4: Baseline regressions – IV estimates
The table reports the regression results of the 2SLS estimation of equation 1. The top panel shows the first-stage results, while
the bottom panel reports the second-stage results. The dependent variable ∆EMPLOYMENTt is defined as the change in em-
ployment at the firm level over the quarter t; ∆LOANt,t−1 is the average change in used loans at the firm level in quarters t and
t− 1. Both variables are calculated as in equation 2, so that they are bounded between −2 and +2. CSI is the credit supply index,
as defined in Section 3.2 and equation 4. All four regressions are based on the full sample and they differ because of the set of
time and borrower fixed effects that are included, as listed at the bottom of the Table. Fixed effects are constructed based on 30
(2-digit) industries, 7 provinces and 3 class sizes (firms with less than 10 employees, between 10 and 49, and 50 or more). Robust
standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
1st stage Dep var: ∆LOANt,t−1
CSIt,t−1 0.0786*** 0.0779*** 0.0758*** 0.0751***
(0.00609) (0.00609) (0.00609) (0.00622)
R2 0.160 0.161 0.162 0.162
2nd stage Dep Var: ∆EMPLOYMENTt
∆LOANt,t−1 0.437*** 0.438*** 0.445*** 0.363***
(0.0672) (0.0676) (0.0699) (0.0689)
Observations 2,459,948 2,459,948 2,459,948 2,459,948
1st-stage F-statistic 179.6 176.6 166.9 156.3
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter FE Yes . . .
Industry × quarter FE No Yes Yes Yes
Size × quarter FE No No Yes Yes
Province × quarter FE No No No Yes
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Table 6: Job contract heterogeneity
The table reports the (second-stage) regression results of the 2SLS estimation of equation 1. The dependent variable
∆EMPLOYMENTt is defined as the change in employment at the firm level over the quarter t, for the different types of job
contracts, as labeled in each column, divided by the average stock of all firm’s workers over the quarter. Thus, the dependent
variable is not a growth rate but a contribution to the aggregate (at the firm level) growth rate. This means that the estimated
coefficients cannot be interpreted as elasticities, but they need to be scaled by the relative share of the job contracts (see Table
1). ∆LOANt,t−1 is the average change in used loans at the firm level in quarters t and t − 1. In the first stage regressions, the
excluded instrument is the credit supply index CSI, as defined in Section 3.2 and equation 4. The top panel reports the results
for two sub-samples of open-ended and temporary contracts, and the three sub-samples of contract termination (outflows) due
to dismissal, expiration of the contract, or voluntary quit. Temporary contracts includes fixed term direct hires, project workers,
temporary agency workers, trainees and apprentices, and seasonal workers. The bottom panel reports the results for the sub-
samples of changes in employment due to inflows or outflows, and the ones based on three different transitions: from temporary
to open-ended contracts, from full-time to part-time jobs, and from part-time to full-time jobs. All regressions are based on the
full sample and include the same set of time and borrower fixed effects, as listed at the bottom of the Table. Fixed effects are
constructed based on 30 (2-digit) industries, 7 provinces and 3 class sizes (firms with less than 10 employees, between 10 and 49,
and 50 or more). Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Dep. Var.: ∆EMPLOYMENTt
Contracts Reason for exit
Open-ended Temporary Dismissal Expiry Quit
∆LOANt,t−1 0.170*** 0.191*** -0.0357 -0.158*** -0.0334
(0.0449) (0.0471) (0.0222) (0.0330) (0.0283)
Flows Transitions
Inflows Outflows Fixed to open Full to part-time Part-time to full
∆LOANt,t−1 0.0834* -0.277*** 0.0219** -0.00155 -0.00414
(0.0447) (0.0617) (0.00864) (0.00651) (0.00590)
Observations 2,459,948 2,459,948 2,459,948 2,459,948 2,459,948
1st-stage F-statistic 156.3 156.3 156.3 156.3 156.3
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry × quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Size × quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province × quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 7: Worker heterogeneity by education and skills
The table reports the (second-stage) regression results of the 2SLS estimation of equation 1. The dependent variable
∆EMPLOYMENTt is defined as the change in employment at the firm level over the quarter t, for the different types of workers,
as labeled in each column, divided by the average stock of all firm’s workers over the quarter. Thus, the dependent variable is
not a growth rate but a contribution to the aggregate (at the firm level) growth rate. This means that the estimated coefficients
cannot be interpreted as elasticities, but they need to be scaled by the relative share of the workers in the workforce (see Table
1). ∆LOANt,t−1 is the average change in used loans at the firm level in quarters t and t − 1. In the first stage regressions, the
excluded instrument is the credit supply index CSI, as defined in Section 3.2 and equation 4. The top panel reports the results for
workers with low (at most compulsory education), medium (at most upper secondary education), and high (tertiary education)
education—based on the ISCED classification. The bottom panel reports the results for the sub-samples of workers, based on
the skill content of each occupation, defined as low (elementary occupations and services and sales workers), medium (clerical
support workers, craft and related trades workers and plant and machine operators, and assemblers) and high (managers, pro-
fessionals and technicians)—based on the ISCO classification. All regressions are based on the full sample and include the same
set of time and borrower fixed effects, as listed at the bottom of the Table. Fixed effects are constructed based on 30 (2-digit)
industries, 7 provinces and 3 class sizes (firms with less than 10 employees, between 10 and 49, and 50 or more). Robust standard
errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Dep. Var.: ∆EMPLOYMENTt
Education level
Low Medium High
∆LOANt,t−1 0.186*** 0.151*** 0.0261*
(0.0403) (0.0371) (0.0144)
Skill level
Low Medium High
∆LOANt,t−1 0.156*** 0.135*** 0.0725***
(0.0397) (0.0375) (0.0215)
Observations 2,459,948 2,459,948 2,459,948
1st-stage F-statistic 156.3 156.3 156.3
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
Industry × quarter FE Yes Yes Yes
Size × quarter FE Yes Yes Yes
Province × quarter FE Yes Yes Yes
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Table 8: Worker heterogeneity by personal characteristics
The table reports the (second-stage) regression results of the 2SLS estimation of equation 1. The dependent variable
∆EMPLOYMENTt is defined as the change in employment at the firm level over the quarter t, for the different types of workers,
as labeled in each column, divided by the average stock of all firm’s workers over the quarter. Thus, the dependent variable is
not a growth rate but a contribution to the aggregate (at the firm level) growth rate. This means that the estimated coefficients
cannot be interpreted as elasticities, but they need to be scaled by the relative share of the workers in the workforce (see Table
1). ∆LOANt,t−1 is the average change in used loans at the firm level in quarters t and t − 1. In the first stage regressions, the
excluded instrument is the credit supply index CSI, as defined in Section 3.2 and equation 4. The left panel reports the results for
the sub-samples of men and women. The middle panel reports the results for the sub-samples of workers whose age is below or
above 30 years. The right panel show the results for the sub-sample of Italian and foreign workers. All regressions are based on
the full sample and include the same set of time and borrower fixed effects, as listed at the bottom of the Table. Fixed effects are
constructed based on 30 (2-digit) industries, 7 provinces and 3 class sizes (firms with less than 10 employees, between 10 and 49,
and 50 or more). Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Dep. Var.: ∆EMPLOYMENTt
Gender Age Nationality
Male Female Under 30 Over 30 Italian Foreign
∆LOANt,t−1 0.144*** 0.220*** 0.105*** 0.257*** 0.274*** 0.0885***
(0.0421) (0.0419) (0.0295) (0.0539) (0.0586) (0.0245)
Observations 2,459,948 2,459,948 2,459,948 2,459,948 2,459,948 2,459,948
1st-stage F-statistic 156.3 156.3 156.3 156.3 156.3 156.3
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry × quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Size × quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province × quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 9: The effect of contract type and education
The table reports the (second-stage) regression results of the 2SLS estimation of equation 1. The dependent variable
∆EMPLOYMENTt is defined as the change in employment at the firm level over the quarter t, for the different types of con-
tracts (open-ended and temporary) and workers (with low, middle, and high education), as labeled in each row and column,
respectively. Those flows are divided by the average stock of all firm’s workers over the quarter. Thus, the dependent variable
is not a growth rate but a contribution to the aggregate (at the firm level) growth rate. This means that the estimated coefficients
cannot be interpreted as elasticities, but they need to be scaled by the relative share of the workers in the workforce (see Table
1). ∆LOANt,t−1 is the average change in used loans at the firm level in quarters t and t − 1. In the first stage regressions, the
excluded instrument is the credit supply index CSI, as defined in Section 3.2 and equation 4. Results reported in the top panel
refer to open-ended contracts, for different level of worker education. Results reported in the bottom panel refer to fixed-ended
contracts, for different level of worker education. Temporary contracts includes fixed term direct hires, project workers, tem-
porary agency workers, trainees and apprentices, and seasonal workers. Education level are based on the ISCED classification:
low means at most compulsory education, medium is at most upper secondary education, and high indicates tertiary education.
All regressions are based on the full sample and include the same set of time and borrower fixed effects, as listed at the bottom
of the Table. Fixed effects are constructed based on 30 (2-digit) industries, 7 provinces and 3 class sizes (firms with less than 10
employees, between 10 and 49, and 50 or more). Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Dep. Var.: ∆EMPLOYMENTt
Education: Low Medium High
Open-ended contract
∆LOANt,t−1 0.0683*** 0.0816*** 0.0214***
(0.0248) (0.0247) (0.00821)
Temporary contract
∆LOANt,t−1 0.115*** 0.0716*** 0.00420
(0.0301) (0.0275) (0.0121)
Observations 2,459,948 2,459,948 2,459,948
1st-stage F-statistic 156.3 156.3 156.3
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
Industry × quarter FE Yes Yes Yes
Size × quarter FE Yes Yes Yes
Province × quarter FE Yes Yes Yes
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Table 10: Firm heterogeneity by size and sector
The table reports the (second-stage) regression results of the 2SLS estimation of equation 1. The dependent variable
∆EMPLOYMENTt is defined as the change in employment at the firm level over the quarter t; ∆LOANt,t−1 is the average
change in used loans at the firm level in quarters t and t− 1. In the first stage regressions, the excluded instrument is the credit
supply index CSI, as defined in Section 3.2 and equation 4. The left panel reports the results for three sub-samples defined on the
basis of firm size. Firm size bins identify micro (less than 10 employees), small (between 10 and 49 employees) and medium and
large firms (50 or more employees). The right panel reports the results for the sub-sample of firms in the industry and service
sectors. All regressions are based on the full sample and include the same set of time and borrower fixed effects, as listed at the
bottom of the Table. Fixed effects are constructed based on 30 (2-digit) industries, 7 provinces and 3 class sizes (firms with less
than 10 employees, between 10 and 49, and 50 or more). Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Dep. Var.: ∆EMPLOYMENTt
Firm size Sector
Micro Small Med-Large Industry Services
∆LOANt,t−1 0.327*** 0.618*** 3.737 0.167 0.427***
(0.0719) (0.226) (7.980) (0.135) (0.0803)
Observations 2,086,193 333,629 40,126 818,609 1,641,339
1st-stage F-statistic 133.5 25.13 0.320 34.76 122.6
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry × quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Size × quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province × quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 11: Firm heterogeneity by financial characteristics
The table reports the (second-stage) regression results of the 2SLS estimation of equation 1. The dependent variable
∆EMPLOYMENTt is defined as the change in employment at the firm level over the quarter t; ∆LOANt,t−1 is the average change
in used loans at the firm level in quarters t and t− 1. In the first stage regressions, the excluded instrument is the credit supply
index CSI, as defined in Section 3.2 and equation 4. The left panel reports the results for the sub-samples of firms with low and
high debt per employee. The middle panel reports the results for the sub-samples of firms which at the beginning of the period
had a low and high utilization of granted credit lines (i.e. with the ratio of utilized loans over granted loans below or above the
median). The different sample splits (low and high) are calculated along the median value within each industry-province-size
cluster, measured at end-2007. The right panel separates between firms which borrows from only one bank (Single-bank) and
firms with multiple banking relationships (Multi-banks). All regressions are based on the full sample and include the same set of
time and borrower fixed effects, as listed at the bottom of the Table. Fixed effects are constructed based on 30 (2-digit) industries,
7 provinces and 3 class sizes (firms with less than 10 employees, between 10 and 49, and 50 or more). Robust standard errors in
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Dep. Var.: ∆EMPLOYMENTt
Debt Credit lines use Relationship lending
Low High Low High Single-bank Multi-banks
∆LOANt,t−1 0.269*** 0.498*** 0.276*** 0.460*** 0.369*** 0.773***
(0.0682) (0.145) (0.0760) (0.129) (0.114) (0.260)
Observations 1,207,961 1,251,987 1,222,596 1,237,352 1,393,068 1,013,409
1st-stage F-statistic 100.7 81.05 89.66 72.19 59.97 25.55
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry × quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Size × quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province × quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 12: Adjustment at the intensive and extensive margins
The table reports the (second-stage) regression results of the 2SLS estimation of equation 1. The dependent variable is:
∆EMPLOYMENTt, defined as the change in employment at the firm level over the year t (columns 1 and 4); and EXITt, defined
as a dichotomous variable equal to one if the firm closed in the quarter t but was still in operation in the previous quarter t− 1, and
zero elsewhere (column 5). ∆LOANt,t−1 is the average change in used loans at the firm level in the year t− 1. ∆EMPLOYMENTt
and ∆LOANt,t−1 are calculated as in equation 2, so that they are bounded between −2 and +2. In the first stage regressions,
the excluded instrument is the credit supply index CSI, as defined in Section 3.2 and equation 4. Results in columns 1 and 5 are
based on the full sample, while all other results are based on the sub-sample that excludes firm closures (i.e. a firm that closes in
a given quarter is still in the sample for the previous quarters, when it was active). Results for this sub-sample are reported both
for all job contracts (column 2) and separated for the different types of contracts (open-ended and temporary, columns 3 and 4).
Temporary contracts includes fixed term direct hires, project workers, temporary agency workers, trainees and apprentices, and
seasonal workers. All linear regressions are based on the full sample and include the same set of time and borrower fixed effects,
as listed at the bottom of the Table. Fixed effects are constructed based on 30 (2-digit) industries, 7 provinces and 3 class sizes
(firms with less than 10 employees, between 10 and 49, and 50 or more). Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Dep. Var.: ∆EMPLOYMENTt EXITt
Full sample Excluding firm closures Full sample
All contracts Open-ended Temporary
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆LOANt,t−1 0.363*** 0.252*** 0.0653** 0.185*** -0.0591***
(0.0689) (0.0572) (0.0314) (0.0472) (0.0184)
Observations 2,459,948 2,443,651 2,443,651 2,443,651 2,459,948
1st-stage F-statistic 156.3 156.0 156.0 156.0 156.3
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry × quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Size × quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province × quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 13: The effect of contract type and education, intensive margin
The table reports the (second-stage) regression results of the 2SLS estimation of equation 1 on a restricted sample that excludes
firm closures (i.e. a firm that closes in a given quarter is still in the sample for the previous quarters, when it was active).
The dependent variable ∆EMPLOYMENTt is defined as the change in employment at the firm level over the quarter t, for the
different types of contracts (open-ended and temporary) and workers (with low, middle, and high education), as labeled in each
row and column, respectively. Those flows are divided by the average stock of all firm’s workers over the quarter. Thus, the
dependent variable is not a growth rate but a contribution to the aggregate (at the firm level) growth rate. This means that the
estimated coefficients cannot be interpreted as elasticities, but they need to be scaled by the relative share of the workers in the
workforce (see Table 1). ∆LOANt,t−1 is the average change in used loans at the firm level in quarters t and t− 1. In the first stage
regressions, the excluded instrument is the credit supply index CSI, as defined in Section 3.2 and equation 4. Results reported
in the top panel refer to all job contracts, the ones reported in the middle panel to open-ended contracts, and the ones reported
in the bottom panel refer to fixed-ended contracts, for different level of worker education. Temporary contracts includes fixed
term direct hires, project workers, temporary agency workers, trainees and apprentices, and seasonal workers. Education level
are based on the ISCED classification: low means at most compulsory education, medium is at most upper secondary education,
and high indicates tertiary education. All regressions are based on the full sample and include the same set of time and borrower
fixed effects, as listed at the bottom of the Table. Fixed effects are constructed based on 30 (2-digit) industries, 7 provinces and
3 class sizes (firms with less than 10 employees, between 10 and 49, and 50 or more). Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Dep. Var.: ∆EMPLOYMENTt
Education level
Low Medium High
All contract
∆LOANt,t−1 0.141*** 0.100*** 0.0108
(0.0373) (0.0325) (0.0136)
Open-ended contract
∆LOANt,t−1 0.0261 0.0307* 0.00897
(0.0220) (0.0186) (0.00717)
Temporary contract
∆LOANt,t−1 0.114*** 0.0694** 0.00181
(0.0303) (0.0276) (0.0121)
Observations 2,443,651 2,443,651 2,443,651
1st-stage F-statistic 156.0 156.0 156.0
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
Industry × quarter FE Yes Yes Yes
Size × quarter FE Yes Yes Yes
Province × quarter FE Yes Yes Yes
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Table 14: Orthogonality conditions, balance sheet characteristics
The table reports the average values of a set of variables (by row) for each quintile of the sample distribution of the credit supply
index (CSI). Labor productivity is calculated as value added per worker; Capital per worker is defined as the ratio between the
stock of (tangible and intangible) assets and total employment; Age is measured by the number of years in operation; Riskiness
is defined by the Altman (1968) z-score (see Section 5 for details); Leverage is measured by the ratio of financial debt over the
sum of financial debt and equity. For the definition of CSI see Section 3.2 and equation 4. The last column reports the correlation
between each of the row variables and the CSI in the whole sample.
Quintile of exposure to credit supply shock Correlation with
1 2 3 4 5 credit supply (CSI)
Credit supply index (CSI) -0.037 -0.017 -0.008 -0.001 0.018
Labor productivity 51.4 55.0 53.7 46.4 49.3 -0.007
Capital per worker 303.1 284.7 386.3 352.4 287.6 0.000
Age 10.300 12.300 12.500 10.400 9.350 -0.036
Riskiness 5.407 5.253 5.260 5.176 5.319 -0.026
Leverage 0.669 0.661 0.663 0.632 0.640 -0.034
Table 15: The effects of financial shocks on employment and capital accumulation
The table reports the (second-stage) regression results of the 2SLS estimation of equation 1. The dependent variable is:
∆EMPLOYMENTt, defined as the change in employment at the firm level over the year t (columns 1 and 2); and ∆CAPITALt,
defined as the change in the stock of (tangible and intangible) assets at the firm level over the year t (column 3). ∆LOANt,t−1 is the
average change in used loans at the firm level in the year t− 1. ∆EMPLOYMENTt and ∆LOANt,t−1 are calculated as in equation
2, so that they are bounded between −2 and +2. In the first stage regressions, the excluded instrument is the credit supply index
CSI, as defined in Section 3.2 and equation 4. Results in column 1 are based on the full sample, while all other results are based
on the sub-sample obtained matching the whole sample with the data from the CADS database. All regressions are based on
the full sample and include the same set of time and borrower fixed effects, as listed at the bottom of the Table. Fixed effects are
constructed based on 30 (2-digit) industries, 7 provinces and 3 class sizes (firms with less than 10 employees, between 10 and 49,
and 50 or more). Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Dep. Var.: ∆EMPLOYMENTt ∆CAPITALt
Sample: All firms CADS CADS
(1) (2) (3)
∆LOANt,t−1 0.347*** 0.0952** 1.210***
(0.0504) (0.0459) (0.315)
Observations 715,920 169,881 169,881
1st-stage F-statistic 421.8 71.26 71.26
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
Industry × year FE Yes Yes Yes
Size × year FE Yes Yes Yes
Province × year FE Yes Yes Yes
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Online Appendix
A-I Data: sources and construction of the final dataset
Our work relies on three main sources of data: (i) PLANET, an administrative dataset main-
tained by the regional public employment service Veneto Lavoro, which collects information
on workers’ flows in the Italian region of Veneto28; (ii) ASIA, the firm register maintained by
the Italian Statistical Office (ISTAT), which provides information on the stock of employed
workers29; and (iii) the Credit Register, managed by the Bank of Italy, which report informa-
tion on the outstanding bank loans to Italian firms. In what follows we briefly describe each
data source (Section A-I.1), the results of the merging process of the three archives and the
additional filters that have been applied to clean the data (Section A-I.2), and the main choices
behind the creation of crucial variables which are possibly missing in the data (Section A-I.3).
A-I.1 Data sources
A-I.1.1 PLANET
PLANET is an administrative dataset of daily labor market flows maintained by the regional
employment agency Veneto Lavoro. According to the Italian law, firms have to notify the
start, modification or end of a labor contract to the regional system of public employment
services. The norm regards exclusively the work relationships regulated by a contract be-
tween the worker and the employer. Hence, the archive does not include self-employed and
entrepreneurs, unless they hold a job contract. Moreover, given that PLANET collects only
flow data, workers who never experienced a transition in the period of observation are not
registered in the archive.
Since 2008 all the information have to be entered through online forms, leading to almost
universal coverage. This massive amount of data is currently made available only for the
Veneto region, thanks to the work of Veneto Lavoro, the regional public employment service.
Before entering the archive, each record filed to Veneto Lavoro undergoes a complex val-
idation procedure, which includes, whenever necessary, a manual check of the information
provided to the agency. All the validated records are compared to standardized ancillary ta-
bles in order to correctly interpret, from a semantic viewpoint, the reported information. This
procedure is particularly relevant when free text is involved. Employers, for instance, may
describe the same occupation in a variety of forms; ancillary tables allow to reconcile this vari-
ety with a rigid classification based on standardized codes and labels. Whenever the number
of classes is particularly high, the procedure also includes some aggregation or simplification.
The key variables that undergo this process are:
• the industry, based on the Ateco 2007 classification—a transformation of NACE rev. 2—
and provided at three levels of aggregation;
• the job contracts, based on 44 different types and three aggregation levels defined jointly
with the Labor Ministry in order to take into account the evolution of the relevant norms
and laws;
• the skill content of each occupation, with five different levels of aggregation based on
ISCO codes, starting from around 7,000 elementary descriptions originating from the
National Statistical Office classification;
• the education of the worker, based on ISCED level-1 classification.
We can quantify what fraction of the stock of workers is covered in PLANET by computing
the number of workers registered in PLANET who have an active spell of employment at any
28Further information on PLANET (in Italian) is available here: www.venetolavoro.it/public-use-file
29Further information on ASIA (in Italian) is available here: www.istat.it/it/archivio/106814
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given moment in time, and comparing it with the official labor force statistics. For the sake of
full comparability between the two data sources, we focus on employed workers in the non-
financial private sector. The difference between the two sources is relatively small (less than 7
percent in 2012) and is due to employees that did not experience any labor market transition
in the period 2008-2012.
A-I.1.2 ASIA
ASIA is the official register of active firms maintained by ISTAT, the Italian Statistical Office.
The register covers firms in the private sector (agriculture is excluded) that have been active for
more than 6 months in each calendar year, and include information on firms’ geographical lo-
cation, sector, number and location of plants, start and end date of activity, average workforce
dimension.30
A-I.1.3 Credit Register
The Credit Register (CR) is an information system operated by the Bank of Italy that collects
the data supplied by banks and financial companies on the credit they grant to their customers.
Specifically, for each borrower, banks and financial companies have to report, on a monthly ba-
sis, the amount of each loan for all loans exceeding a minimum threshold (75,000 euro until
December 2008, 30,000 euro afterwards), plus all nonperforming loans. Given the low thresh-
old, these data can be taken as a census.
A-I.2 Merging the archives
The merge of the three archives uses the fiscal code as unique identifier of the firm. We consider
only private non-financial non-primary firms and we also exclude temp agencies, care givers
and house cleaners. The process of data cleansing involves the removal of: (i) firms that closed
before January 1st 2008, (ii) records with missing date for the event which originated the com-
munication, (iii) records where the end of the contract is prior to the start of the contract, and
(iv) records where the start of the contract is after the date of firm closure as reported in ASIA.
After these filtering procedures, we are left with 436,311 firms, meaning that we loose about 10
percent percent of the firms from the original sample. Of these remaining firms, 204,301 can be
matched with the credit register since they have credit relationship with the banking system.
A-I.3 Variable creation
We add two main variables to PLANET: a quarterly indicator whether a firm is alive, and a
quarterly reconstruction of the stock of workers. For the first we take the start and end dates
from ASIA, whenever possible. If the start date is missing, we place it:
• at the last quarter of the year before the firm is first observed in ASIA with positive size,
or
• at the quarter before the first movement is observed in PLANET,
whatever comes first. If the end date is missing in ASIA, we place it:
• at the first quarter of the year after the firm is last observed in ASIA with positive size, or
30Hence, it is possible that some firms are not present in the archive even though their lifetime is longer than six
months. For instance, a firm established in October 2009 and closed down in May 2010—hence spanning for more
than six months overall—is not present in the archive. Moreover, a firm that has been established in October 2009
and remained active throughout 2010 is not recorded in the 2009 archive, but only in the 2010, which also reports
the correct starting date of the firm. Similarly, a firm that was active throughout 2009 but closed down in May 2010
is not recorded in the 2010 archives; however, its closing date is not always reported back to the 2009 record.
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• at the quarter of the last movement observed in PLANET, provided that the variation is
negative and the cumulative employment variation is also negative,
whatever comes last. Firm-quarter observations where the firm is deemed inactive are dropped
from the final sample, leaving us with an unbalanced panel.
To reconstruct quarterly employment stocks, we start from the last information available
in ASIA and we complement it by adding the cumulative movements of workers not included
in ASIA, as observed in PLANET. The two features of the data to confront with in this case are
(i) ASIA registers firm size at the end of the year, but does not consider agency workers and
independent contractors (who are not formally employed by the firm), (ii) PLANET does not
contain information about the stocks, but provides data on daily flows concerning all workers
working for the firm, irrespective of their contract type.
We hence proceed as follows.
1. For firms that are observed in PLANET at the beginning of the period (2008/I): we start
from the ASIA initial (2007) stock, add an estimate of the initial stock of agency workers
and independent contractors based on the information on contract termination, renewal
of transformation available in PLANET, and then add quarter-specific employment vari-
ations directly observed in PLANET;31
2. For new firms that are first observed in PLANET after 2008/I: in this case, stocks can be
retrieved by definition using flows; the first observed stock is given by the first flow aug-
mented by one unit to include the entrepreneur, while the following stocks are retrieved
simply by adding quarter-specific observed flows.
3. For firms observed only on ASIA: they do not have flows during the observed period,
and hence their stocks are constantly equal to the initial stock observed in ASIA.
31As the average duration of temporary contracts in Italy is less than one year (by far in case of temp agency
workers), the period of observation in PLANET (5 years) is long enough to see virtually all temporary contracts
alive in 2007 coming to an end.
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A-II Additional Tables
Table A1: The effect of contract type within firm sector and size
The table reports the (second-stage) regression results of the 2SLS estimation of equation 1. The dependent variable
∆EMPLOYMENTt is defined as the change in employment at the firm level over the quarter t, for the different types of job
contracts—open-ended in the top panel and temporary contract in the bottom panel—divided by the average stock of all firm’s
workers over the quarter. Temporary contracts includes fixed term direct hires, project workers, temporary agency workers,
trainees and apprentices, and seasonal workers. Thus, the dependent variable is not a growth rate but a contribution to the ag-
gregate (at the firm level) growth rate. This means that the estimated coefficients cannot be interpreted as elasticities, but they
need to be scaled by the relative share of the job contracts (see Table 1). Results are reported for different sub-samples across
sectors (industry and services) and firm size. Firm size bins identify micro (less than 10 employees), small (between 10 and 49
employees) and medium and large firms (50 or more employees). ∆LOANt,t−1 is the average change in used loans at the firm
level in quarters t and t − 1. In the first stage regressions, the excluded instrument is the credit supply index CSI, as defined
in Section 3.2 and equation 4. All regressions are based on the full sample and include the same set of time and borrower fixed
effects, as listed at the bottom of the Table. Fixed effects are constructed based on 30 (2-digit) industries, 7 provinces and 3 class
sizes (firms with less than 10 employees, between 10 and 49, and 50 or more). Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Dep. Var.: ∆EMPLOYMENTt
Over sectors Over firm size
Open-ended contract
∆LOANt,t−1 0.124 0.185*** 0.136*** 0.394** 2.346
(0.106) (0.0478) (0.0467) (0.153) (5.046)
Temporary contract
∆LOANt,t−1 0.0444 0.239*** 0.189*** 0.225* 1.392
(0.0769) (0.0581) (0.0504) (0.130) (3.036)
Observations 818,609 1,641,339 2,086,193 333,629 40,126
1st-stage F-statistic 34.76 122.6 133.5 25.13 0.320
Sector Industry Services All firms All firms All firms
Firm size All firms All firms Micro Small Medium-large
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry × quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Size × quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province × quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table A2: The effect of education within firm sector and size
The table reports the (second-stage) regression results of the 2SLS estimation of equation 1. The dependent variable
∆EMPLOYMENTt is defined as the change in employment at the firm level over the quarter t, for the different levels of
education—low, medium and high—divided by the average stock of all firm’s workers over the quarter. Temporary contracts
includes fixed term direct hires, project workers, temporary agency workers, trainees and apprentices, and seasonal workers.
Education level are based on the ISCED classification: low means at most compulsory education, medium is at most upper sec-
ondary education, and high indicates tertiary education. Thus, the dependent variable is not a growth rate but a contribution
to the aggregate (at the firm level) growth rate. This means that the estimated coefficients cannot be interpreted as elasticities,
but they need to be scaled by the relative share of the job contracts (see Table 1). Results are reported for different sub-samples
across sectors (industry and services) and firm size. Firm size bins identify micro (less than 10 employees), small (between 10
and 49 employees) and medium and large firms (50 or more employees). ∆LOANt,t−1 is the average change in used loans at the
firm level in quarters t and t− 1. In the first stage regressions, the excluded instrument is the credit supply index CSI, as defined
in Section 3.2 and equation 4. All regressions are based on the full sample and include the same set of time and borrower fixed
effects, as listed at the bottom of the Table. Fixed effects are constructed based on 30 (2-digit) industries, 7 provinces and 3 class
sizes (firms with less than 10 employees, between 10 and 49, and 50 or more). Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Dep. Var.: ∆EMPLOYMENTt
Over sectors Over firm size
Low education
∆LOANt,t−1 0.106 0.213*** 0.166*** 0.323** 2.091
(0.0874) (0.0448) (0.0423) (0.127) (4.458)
Medium education
∆LOANt,t−1 0.0490 0.184*** 0.138*** 0.237** 1.255
(0.0679) (0.0445) (0.0398) (0.101) (2.710)
High education
∆LOANt,t−1 0.00843 0.0313* 0.0229 0.0514 0.334
(0.0222) (0.0180) (0.0156) (0.0349) (0.743)
Observations 818,609 1,641,339 2,086,193 333,629 40,126
1st-stage F-statistic 34.76 122.6 133.5 25.13 0.320
Sector Industry Services All firms All firms All firms
Firm size All firms All firms Micro Small Medium-large
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry × quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Size × quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province × quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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A-III Additional Figures
Figure A1: Regional bank lending policies
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Notes: elaborations on data from Bank of Italy (Regional Bank Lending Survey). The chart plots the Diffusion Index, calculated
from answers to question 1 (“Over the past 6 months, how have your bank’s credit standards as applied to the approval of loans
or credit lines to enterprises changed?”) of the Regional Bank Lending Survey on Italian Banks (the five possible answers to
questions 1 and 6 are: (i) tighten considerably, (ii) tighten somewhat, (iii) remain basically unchanged, (iv) ease somewhat, and
(v) ease considerably. The diffusion index varies between -1 and 1; it is computed as the weighted mean of answers (i)-(v), where
the values attributed to each answer are 1, 0.5, 0, -0.5, and -1, and the weights are the observed frequencies
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Figure A2: Housing prices in Veneto and Italy, 2000–2013
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Notes: elaborations on data from Bank of Italy and Osservatorio sul Mercato Immobiliare.
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